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Response to Tomasz Zuradzki's ‘Preimplantation genetic diagnosis and rational 
choice under risk or uncertainty’ 
Xavier Symons 
 
Tomasz Zuradzki's recent article is a valuable contribution to bioethical discourse on 
preimplantation genetic diagnosis (PGD). His argument circumvents the non-identity problem that 
plagues other defences of PGD. He also offers an effective critique of Mark Walker's ‘box game’ 
argument for genetic testing. 
Nevertheless, he seems wrong to assert that anyone should accept his argument, even if they 
‘believe embryos have full moral status and their right to life can never be balanced with any other 
social or individual benefits’.1 Zuradzki believes that his argument concerning the ‘hypothetical 
rationality’ and ‘patient autonomy’ of embryos binds everyone—no ethical frameworks excepted—to 
endorse PGD in certain circumstances.1 Hence, he concludes his article by writing 
Even if somebody perceives the freezing and subsequent destruction of the surplus embryos 
remaining after an in vitro procedure to the moral equivalent of killing adults, and thus sees 
potential parents who decide on PGD as just as immoral as the terrorists in the above 
example, she should still accept PGD as a method of embryo selection.1 
Zuradzki fails to address the ethical argumentation of one key opponent of IVF—the Catholic 
Church. This is indeed highly unfortunate, considering Zuradzki is a bioethicist in a country where the 
statements of the Catholic Church have significant impact on medicoethical policy. The following 
remarks are not intended to be an endorsement of Catholic teaching on the matter, though I am 
sympathetic to this position. I simply wish to point out a shortcoming in Zuradzki's argumentation. 
In the 2008 document Dignitas Personae, the Congregation for the Doctrine of the Faith 
(CDF)—the peak bioethical authority in the Church—wrote, ‘All things considered, it needs to be 
recognised that the thousands of abandoned embryos represent a situation of injustice which in fact 
cannot be resolved’.2 The document considers possibilities like the adoption of embryos by married 
couples, but concludes: ‘this proposal, praiseworthy with regard to the intention of respecting and 
defending human life, presents various problems not dissimilar to [any other form of surrogate 
motherhood]’.2 
Most Catholic moral theologians have interpreted this as putting embryos in a situation of 
‘ethical limbo’—their ontological status is so removed from the natural order that they fall outside 
the moral universe of Christian ethics.i 3-5 
Returning to Zuradzki's paper, it seems to me that he misses this nuance in the Church's 
writings on the status of embryos. He claims that his reasoning is binding even on ‘those who claim 
that early embryos have full moral status, and their right to life can never be balanced with any other 
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social or individual benefits’.1 However, the aforementioned statements of the CDF go beyond this 
basic formulation of pro-life ethics. 
Applying the theory of Dignitas Personae, it seems to me that an orthodox Catholic would 
not be obliged to choose PGD. The knowledge that a grave wrong would come of it—the only 
possible outcome considering the absurd existential state of the embryo—vitiates any moral 
obligation.ii 6 Appealing to ‘honoring the patient autonomy’ of the ‘hypothetical rational agent’ does 
not affect the position. In many cases, an orthodox Catholic ethics demands that one ignore a 
patient's desires—Catholic teaching on the performance of abortion is perhaps the most 
controversial example. PGD for serious illness is obviously linked to the selection of certain embryos 
over others. Due to this link, one would have no duty to perform or facilitate PGD. They would, in 
fact, have a duty to do the contrary. 
Such a conclusion may be unpalatable, but as far as I can see, this is where this particular 
strand of pro-life ethics leads. Insofar as I am correct, Zuradzki's claim fails. Some positions remain 
unaffected by his proposed ‘hypothetical preference-patient autonomy’ argument. If his aim is to 
find a policy acceptable on all moral frameworks, his thesis needs to be fundamentally changed. 
 
Footnotes 
i Brugger's article3  also contains a summary of the minority opposing view. 
ii An earlier Church, document, Donum Vitae, echoes Dignitas Personae when describing the “absurd 
fate” that embryos are exposed to. See reference 6. 
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